Assessing the liability for artificial intelligence systems under the modern tort regime in Uganda: the case of negligence and defamation

Abstract

The law of tort aims to provide redress through civil proceedings to persons who have been wronged. This redress is either through an award of compensation in the form of damages or through other means such as an injunction. However, the current tort regime—adopted from British Common Law—did not envisage the advent of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Hence, there is a gap in the legal regime when wrongful acts are not committed by human persons but rather by AI systems. Given such a lacuna, this dissertation explores Artificial Intelligence and Deepfake technology and establishes a link between the two and the law of Negligence and Defamation. It interrogates the question of liability for wrongs committed by AI systems and examines to whom liability will accrue in such circumstances. It then makes recommendations to key stakeholders such as the Parliament and the Cabinet of Uganda to address the gaps in Ugandan law such that it can better accommodate the possibility of wrongs committed by AI systems.